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Republican States Bolstered Their Health 
Insurance Rate Review Programs Using 
Incentives From the Affordable Care Act
Brent D. Fulton, PhD1, Ann Hollingshead, MPP1,  
Pinar Karaca-Mandic, PhD2, and Richard M. Scheffler, PhD1
Abstract
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) included financial and regulatory incentives and goals for states to bolster their health 
insurance rate review programs, increase their anticipated loss ratio requirements, expand Medicaid, and establish state-
based exchanges. We grouped states by political party control and compared their reactions across these policy goals. To 
identify changes in states’ rate review programs and anticipated loss ratio requirements in the individual and small group 
markets since the ACA’s enactment, we conducted legal research and contacted each state’s insurance regulator. We 
linked rate review program changes to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS) criteria for an effective rate 
review program. We found, of states that did not meet CMS’s criteria when the ACA was enacted, most made changes 
to meet those criteria, including Republican-controlled states, which generally oppose the ACA. This finding is likely the 
result of the relatively low administrative burden associated with reviewing health insurance rates and the fact that doing so 
prevents federal intervention in rate review. However, Republican-controlled states were less likely than non-Republican-
controlled states to increase their anticipated loss ratio requirements to align with the federal retrospective medical loss 
ratio requirement, expand Medicaid, and establish state-based exchanges, because of their general opposition to the ACA. 
We conclude that federal incentives for states to strengthen their health insurance rate review programs were more effective 
than the incentives for states to adopt other insurance-related policy goals of the ACA.
Keywords
health care reform, Affordable Care Act, health insurance rate review, policy implementation, federalism, politics
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Introduction
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) sought to increase access to 
more affordable health insurance through a number of provi-
sions. It expanded Medicaid eligibility and provided pre-
mium tax credits to households with incomes between 100% 
and 400% of the federal poverty level that purchased insur-
ance within the ACA’s newly established health insurance 
exchanges (or marketplaces). These provisions increased 
access to insurance; however, that access is unaffordable to 
many individuals and small employers because of rising 
health insurance premiums.1
To try to reduce the health insurance premium growth, 
some stakeholders wanted the ACA to give the federal gov-
ernment the authority to reject proposed health insurance rate 
increases determined to be unreasonable. But in the end, poli-
cymakers compromised by including incentives to strengthen 
states’ health insurance rate review programs and by estab-
lishing a federal medical loss ratio requirement. Since the 
ACA’s enactment, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) has made annual and ad hoc evaluations to 
determine whether each state’s rate review program is 
effective.2-5 CMS bases its determination on whether the state 
(1) receives sufficient data and documentation to determine 
the reasonableness of the proposed rate increase (whereby the 
rate is the unit price of insurance, and the premium is based 
on the rate coupled with the benefit design and allowable rat-
ing factors, such as age, geography, family composition, and 
tobacco use); (2) conducts a timely review that considers 
changes in factors such as medical cost, utilization, benefits, 
and cost sharing; and (3) bases its determination of the rea-
sonableness of rate increases on a standard that is set forth in 
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state statute or regulation.6 Beginning September 1, 2011, in 
the individual and small group markets, non-grandfathered 
health insurance annualized rate increases of 10% or more 
must either be reviewed by the state or CMS for reasonable-
ness. States with an effective rate review program conduct the 
review and make this determination, but CMS plays this role 
for states with ineffective rate review programs. The ACA 
allocated $250 million for states to bolster their rate review 
programs, including helping states to establish effective pro-
grams. The grants have been used by 44 states to hire and 
contract with actuaries, upgrade information systems, and 
enhance rate transparency.7,8
In addition to incentivizing states to impede unreasonable 
premium rate increases, the ACA encourages states to play a 
role in expanding insurance coverage. A number of studies 
have examined the factors that led states to decide whether to 
expand Medicaid or establish a state-based exchange.9-13 
Politics loomed large in both decisions. Beland, Rocco, and 
Waddan found that Medicaid expansion and state-based 
exchange decisions required institutional coordination 
between the federal and state governments, further compli-
cated by the fact that most states needed both the governor’s 
and legislature’s approval.9 Jones and colleagues describe 
how several Republican-controlled states, which were ini-
tially receptive to establishing state-based exchanges, acqui-
esced in the face of intense political pressure to oppose the 
ACA in general.10
However, politics was not the only factor in state decision 
making. Although Democratically controlled states were 
more likely to expand Medicaid than Republican-controlled 
states, economic circumstances, previous Medicaid expan-
sion, and administrative capacity all played a role in states’ 
decisions to expand Medicaid.11 Haeder and Weimer discuss 
the influence of state insurance commissioners and existing 
administrative capacity within states that established state-
based exchanges.12
To our knowledge, however, no studies have examined 
which states, by political party control, decided to establish 
an effective rate review program and create an anticipated 
loss ratio requirement that is consistent with the federal ret-
rospective medical loss ratio requirement. In the remainder 
of this article, we first examine CMS’s determinations of the 
effectiveness of each state’s rate review program over time 
and highlight the states that took actions to become effective. 
Second, we report the share of states, by political party con-
trol, that made changes to become effective rate review pro-
grams, increased their anticipated loss ratio requirement to 
align with the federal medical loss ratio requirement, 
expanded Medicaid, and established a state-based exchange. 
We statistically test whether these 4 decisions differed by 
state political party control. Our hypothesis is that although 
Republican-controlled states generally oppose the ACA as a 
whole and chose to not emulate the federal medical loss 
ratio, not expand Medicaid, nor establish a state-based 
exchange, they would nonetheless establish effective rate 
review programs at a similar rate to non-Republican-con-
trolled states, because reviewing rates has a relatively low 
administrative burden and doing so would prevent federal 
review of their carriers’ rates.
Data and Methods
Whereas several studies have documented states’ rate review 
and anticipated loss ratio laws at a point in time,14-21 we are 
the first to document changes over time between 2010 and 
2013. Our sources included statutes, regulations, and insur-
ance department bulletins. We also examined states’ cycle I 
and II grant applications “Grants to States for Health Insurance 
Premium Review” submitted to CMS, states’ medical loss 
ratio waiver applications submitted to the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the studies refer-
enced above. After completing this legal research, we con-
tacted state legislative librarians to review our findings. We 
then contacted the state agency that regulated health insur-
ance to review our findings and to better understand their rate 
review programs. We received a full response from 47 state 
regulators and the District of Columbia, and a partial response 
from three state regulators, and thus relied on in-state health 
insurance experts to confirm our findings.
Since the enactment of the ACA, CMS has continually 
determined the effectiveness of each state’s rate review pro-
gram (using the criteria discussed in the Introduction), and 
has published its determinations as of the following dates: 
July 1, 2011,2 February 16, 2012,3 May 3, 2013,4 and April 
16, 2014.5 We classified each state into one of the following 
categories:
•• Always Had Effective Rate Review Program: States 
that CMS determined to have effective rate review 
programs for all major types of carriers (ie, for-profit 
insurers, non-profits, and health maintenance organi-
zations [HMOs]) for each of its reviews, and based on 
our analysis, had already met CMS’s effectiveness 
criteria when the ACA was enacted.
•• Effective Rate Review Program via Changes: States 
that made changes to rate review statutes or regula-
tions after the ACA was enacted to become effective 
rate review programs. Many of these states did not 
receive an “ineffective” determination from CMS, 
because the change was made prior to CMS’s first 
determination, effective July 1, 2011. We identified 
these states by linking their statutory and regulatory 
rate review changes to CMS’s effectiveness criteria, 
to determine which states met CMS’s effectiveness 
criteria as a result of the changes.
•• Ineffective Rate Review Program: States that had an 
ineffective rate review program as of April 16, 2014.
Prior to the ACA, many states established an anticipated 
loss ratio requirement within a law, regulation, or bulletin for 
Fulton et al 3
the individual and small group markets.20 The state loss 
ratios were strictly based on the share of premiums repre-
sented by medical claims,22 whereas the federal medical loss 
ratio allows for quality improvement adjustments as well as 
tax, license, and regulatory fee adjustments, reducing the tra-
ditionally defined state loss ratio by a few percentage points. 
Therefore, we assumed that a 75% state loss ratio require-
ment was equivalent to the 80% federal medical loss ratio 
requirement. In the individual market, DHHS granted 7 of 
the 17 states that applied for temporary relief to lower the 
federal medical loss ratio threshold to between 65% and 75% 
for 2011 and 2012; however, each of these states had an 80% 
requirement by 2013.23 Based on our research, 23 states in 
the individual market and 13 states in the small group market 
already had anticipated loss ratio requirements for their 
major types of carriers when the ACA was enacted; however, 
only 3 states in the individual market and 5 states in the small 
group market had a requirement of at least 75%. Hence, we 
examined whether the remaining states and the District of 
Columbia established or increased their anticipated loss ratio 
requirement to be at least 75% by December 31, 2013. 
Although the ACA did not have an explicit financial incen-
tive for states to establish an anticipated loss ratio that is con-
sistent with the federal medical loss ratio, increasing carriers’ 
loss ratios was a goal of the ACA. This goal creates an 
implicit incentive, because a state does not want to determine 
a rate increase to be reasonable and then systematically have 
carriers’ medical loss ratios exceed the 80% federal medical 
loss ratio threshold.
For Medicaid expansion and state-based exchange deci-
sions, we relied on secondary sources. Twenty-seven states 
and the District of Columbia (or 55%) expanded Medicaid as 
of August 28, 2014.24 Eighteen states and the District of 
Columbia (or 37%) established state-based exchanges as of 
October 1, 2013, the beginning of the first open enrollment 
period.25,26 Mississippi and Utah only established their 
exchanges in the small group market. Furthermore, Nevada, 
New Mexico, and Oregon have subsequently decided to have 
a federally supported state-based exchange in which they 
rely on the federal Web site and information technology; 
however, we based our analysis on their October 1, 2013, 
statuses.27
We classified states’ political party control as of January 
31, 2011, as follows: Republican or Democratic if the 
Republican Party or Democratic Party, respectively, con-
trolled both houses and the governor’s office.28 Otherwise 
states were considered divided.
We used a Fisher exact test to test whether the percentage 
of states that adopted these 4 policy goals differed by politi-
cal party control. We used this test because the decision was 
binary and the expected frequency of particular cells was less 
than 5.29 We used a McNemar exact test to test whether 
Republican-controlled states adopted these 4 policies at dif-
ferent rates, because the data were generated from the same 
sample of states, the decision was binary, and the expected 
frequency of particular cells was less than 5. This test 
included only the sub-sample of Republican-controlled states 
that had not adopted the policies being compared prior to the 
ACA. Results were considered statistically significant if the 
P value was less than .05 using a 2-tailed test.
Results
Status of the Effectiveness of States’ Health 
Insurance Rate Review Programs
Figures 1 and 2 show the effectiveness status of each state’s 
rate review program in the individual and small group mar-
kets, respectively, from July 1, 2011, to April 16, 2014. These 
maps show that 37 states in the individual market and 27 
states in the small group market that CMS determined to 
have effective rate review programs for each of its reviews, 
and based on our analysis, had already met CMS’s effective-
ness criteria when the ACA was enacted. However, as we 
discuss below, altogether, 9 states in the individual market 
and 19 states in the small group market responded to the 
CMS incentive and became effective rate review programs.
Four states in the individual market and 13 states in the 
small group market took actions after the ACA was enacted 
that enabled them to have effective rate review programs by 
September 1, 2011, the date for which CMS or the state 
would review rate increases of 10% or more (see “Effective 
Rate Review Program via Changes” states with two or three 
asterisks in Figures 1 and 2). For example, Georgia had only 
an “informational only” filing requirement for most rate 
revisions in the individual and small group markets. In 2011, 
Georgia amended Rule Chapter 120-2-98 to require indem-
nity plans, preferred provider organizations, and Blue Cross 
Blue Shield plans to file rate increases of 10% or more, so 
that the state could review the reasonableness of those 
increases.
Meanwhile, 5 states in the individual market and 6 states 
in the small group market, which CMS initially determined 
to have ineffective rate review programs, took action after 
the September 1, 2011, deadline to become effective (see 
“Effective Rate Review Program via Changes” states with no 
asterisks in Figures 1 and 2). For example, although 
Pennsylvania had prior approval authority over all carrier 
types in the individual market as well as HMOs and non-
profit carriers in the small group market, it had no rate filing 
requirements for for-profit insurers in the small group mar-
ket, and thus, was considered ineffective.2 However, in late 
2011, Pennsylvania enacted Act 134 to give it prior approval 
authority over those insurers, enabling it to become an effec-
tive rate review program.3
Finally, 5 states in both the individual and small group 
markets currently have an ineffective rate review program. 
This includes both Oklahoma and Texas, which had effective 
rate review programs in 2011, but decided to not comply 
with reviewing certain federal rate review requirements.
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Figure 2. Effective rate review program status in 2014 and changes in status since the enactment of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) by 
state in the small group market.
Source. Authors’ research, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),2,4,5 and Kaiser Family Foundation.3
Note. In the legend, the numbers in parentheses report the number of states, including the District of Columbia, in the legend category. The effectiveness 
of states’ rate review programs for health insurance sold through associations is not reported.
*These include 2 “Always had Effective Rate Review Program” states (Mississippi and North Carolina) that bolstered their rate review programs via 
legislation or regulation after the ACA was enacted but prior to CMS’s first determination, as of July 1, 2011; however, based on our analysis, these states 
would have still been considered effective had the changes not been made.
**These include 11 “Effective Rate Review Program via Changes” states (Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Nevada, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin) that bolstered their rate review programs via legislation or regulation prior to CMS’s 
first determination, as of July 1, 2011, and, based on our analysis, met the effectiveness criteria as a result of these changes.
***These include 2 “Effective Rate Review Program via Changes” states (Idaho and Iowa) that bolstered their rate review programs via legislation or 
regulation after CMS’s July 1, 2011, ineffective determination, and then became effective by September 1, 2011, the effective date for rate increases at or 
above 10% that are required to be reviewed by the state or CMS.
Figure 1. Effective rate review program status in 2014 and changes in status since the enactment of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) by 
state in the individual market.
Source. Authors’ research, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),2,4,5 and Kaiser Family Foundation.3
Note. In the legend, the numbers in parentheses report the number of states, including the District of Columbia, in the legend category. The effectiveness 
of states’ rate review programs for health insurance sold through associations is not reported.
*These include 3 “Always Had Effective Rate Review Program” states (Michigan, Mississippi, and South Dakota) that bolstered their rate review programs 
via legislation or regulation after the ACA was enacted but prior to CMS’s first determination, as of July 1, 2011; however, based on our analysis, these 
states would have still been considered effective had the changes not been made.
**These include 3 “Effective Rate Review Program via Changes” states (Georgia, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin) that bolstered their rate review programs 
via legislation or regulation prior to CMS’s first determination, as of July 1, 2011, and, based on our analysis, met the effectiveness criteria as a result of 
these changes.
***This includes 1 “Effective Rate Review Program via Changes” state (Idaho) that bolstered its rate review program via legislation or regulation after 
CMS’s July 1, 2011, ineffective determination, and then became effective by September 1, 2011, the effective date for rate increases at or above 10% that 
are required to be reviewed by the state or CMS.
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Comparison of States’ Reactions to the 
Affordable Care Act’s Health Insurance Policy 
Goals
Figures 3 and 4 show states’ reactions to the ACA’s health 
insurance policy goals in the individual and small group mar-
kets, respectively. The figures include a set of 4 bars each for 
Republican-controlled states, politically divided states, and 
Democratically controlled states. For each set, the first bar 
shows the percentage of states that did not meet the require-
ments of an effective rate review program when the ACA 
was enacted, but became effective since its enactment. The 
second bar shows the percentage of states that had an antici-
pated loss ratio requirement below 75% (including those 
states with no requirement) when the ACA was enacted, but 
established or increased their loss ratio requirement to this 
threshold or higher after its enactment. The third and fourth 
bars show the percentage of states that expanded Medicaid 
and established a state-based exchange, respectively.
Figure 3 shows states’ reactions to the 4 health insurance 
policy goals in the individual market. Republican-controlled 
states were moderately—but not statistically—less likely 
than non-Republican-controlled states to establish an effec-
tive rate review program (50.0% vs 83.3%, P = .301) and 
establish or increase their anticipated loss ratio requirement to 
be at least 75% (10.0% vs 25.0%, P = .271). However, 
Republican-controlled states were statistically less likely than 
non-Republican-controlled states to expand Medicaid (23.8% 
Figure 4. Percentage of states that adopted Affordable Care Act’s health insurance policy goals by states’ political party control, small 
group market, 2010-2014.
Source. Authors’ research; Effective Rate Review Programs: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services2,4,5 and Kaiser Family Foundation3; Medicaid 
Expansion: Kaiser Family Foundation24; and State-Based Exchanges: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.26
Note. The numbers in parentheses next to each bar are the number of states (including the District of Columbia) in the numerator and denominator that 
generated the bar’s percentage. The denominators are sometimes less than the total number of states, because some states had an effective rate review 
program or had an anticipated loss ratio requirement of at least 75% when the Affordable Care Act was enacted.
Figure 3. Percentage of states that adopted Affordable Care Act’s health insurance policy goals by states’ political party control, 
individual market, 2010-2014.
Source. Authors’ research; Effective Rate Review Programs: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services2,4,5 and Kaiser Family Foundation3; Medicaid 
Expansion: Kaiser Family Foundation24; and State-Based Exchanges: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.26
Note. The numbers in parentheses next to each bar are the number of states (including the District of Columbia) in the numerator and denominator that 
generated the bar’s percentage. The denominators are sometimes less than the total number of states, because some states had an effective rate review 
program or had an anticipated loss ratio requirement of at least 75% when the Affordable Care Act was enacted.
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vs 76.7%, P < .001) and establish a state-based exchange 
(4.8% vs 53.3%, P < .001). Within Republican-controlled 
states, we compared the rate of establishing an effective rate 
review program with their rates of adopting the other 3 policy 
areas. (Only the 8 Republican states that did not already have 
an effective rate review program in place when the ACA was 
enacted were eligible to be included in these McNemar tests. 
The test with the anticipated loss ratio requirement to be at 
least 75% was not applicable, because none of the 8 states 
established or increased its anticipated loss ratio requirement 
to be at least 75%. For state-level detail on decisions in these 
4 policy areas, see Table A1 in the appendix.) We found that 
these states were less likely to adopt the other policy areas, 
but the differences were not statistically different: establish-
ing or increasing their anticipated loss ratio requirement to be 
at least 75% (50.0% vs 0.0%, P = not applicable), expanding 
Medicaid (50.0% vs 12.5%, P = .250), or establishing a state-
based exchange (50.0% vs 12.5%, P = .250).
Figure 4 shows states’ reactions to the 4 health insurance 
policy goals in the small group market. Republican-controlled 
states were moderately—but not statistically—less likely than 
non-Republican-controlled states to establish an effective rate 
review program (69.2% vs 90.9%, P = .327). However, 
Republican-controlled states were statistically less likely than 
non-Republican-controlled states to establish or increase their 
anticipated loss ratio requirement to be at least 75% (5.3% vs 
33.3%, P = .031), expand Medicaid (23.8% vs 76.7%, P < 
.001), and establish a state-based exchange (9.5% vs 56.7%, P 
= .001). Within Republican-controlled states, we compared 
their rate of establishing an effective rate review program with 
their rates of adopting the other 3 policy areas (Only the 13 
Republican states that did not already have an effective rate 
review program in place when the ACA was enacted were eli-
gible to be included in these McNemar tests. For the test with 
the anticipated loss ratio requirement to be at least 75%, only 
12 of these states were included because one state already had 
an anticipated loss ratio requirement of at least 75% when the 
ACA was enacted. For the Medicaid expansion and state-based 
exchange tests, all 13 states were included. For state-level 
detail on decisions in these 4 policy areas, see Table A1 in the 
appendix.) We found that these states were less likely to adopt 
the other policy areas and the differences were statistically sig-
nificant: establishing or increasing their anticipated loss ratio 
requirement to be at least 75% (66.7% vs 8.3%, P = .016), 
expanding Medicaid (69.2% vs 23.1%, P = .031), or establish-
ing a state-based exchange (69.2% vs 7.7%, P = .008).
For example, South Carolina, a Republican-controlled 
state that neither expanded Medicaid nor established a state-
based exchange, had prior approval authority over some 
types of plans in the small group market, but no filing 
requirement for most insurers, non-profit carriers, and 
HMOs. On June 29, 2011, it issued Bulletin 2011-03, giving 
itself prior approval authority over those carriers’ rates, 
effective September 1, 2011. This change enabled the state to 
become an effective rate review program.2
Discussion
The ACA included financial and regulatory incentives and 
goals for states to bolster their health insurance rate review 
programs, increase their anticipated loss ratio requirements, 
expand Medicaid, and establish state-based exchanges. Both 
Republican-controlled and non-Republican-controlled states 
established effective rate review programs at a high rate: For 
Republican-controlled states, the rates were 50% and 69% in 
the individual and small group markets, respectively, and for 
non-Republican-controlled states, the rates were 83% and 
91% in the individual and small group markets, respectively. 
However, Republican-controlled states were less likely than 
non-Republican-controlled states to establish or increase 
anticipated loss ratio requirement to be at least 75% (only in 
the small group market), expand Medicaid, and establish a 
state-based exchange. Particularly in the small group market, 
Republican-controlled states were more likely to establish an 
effective rate review program than to establish or increase 
their anticipated loss ratio requirement to be consistent with 
the federal retrospective medical loss ratio requirement, 
expand Medicaid, or establish a state-based exchange.
The ACA’s attempt to strengthen states’ health insurance 
rate review programs is reminiscent of the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion. Under both policies, the federal government set 
minimum standards and provided financial incentives for 
states to pursue a federalist policy goal.
There is a notable difference, however. For rate review pro-
grams, the ACA created a clear federal role for non-compliant 
states. Specifically, CMS reviews non-grandfathered carriers’ 
rate increases of 10% or more in the individual and small 
group markets in states with ineffective rate review programs. 
This incentivized states, including Republican-controlled 
states that generally oppose the ACA, to establish effective 
rate review programs. For example, in April 2011, Idaho’s 
Republican governor issued Executive Order No. 2011-03 
ordering executive agencies to not implement the ACA; how-
ever, in August 2011, the Idaho Department of Insurance 
received a waiver to begin conducting rate review in compli-
ance with the ACA, in part, “to help preserve state oversight of 
rates.”30 In contrast, there was no federal intervention for 
states that did not expand Medicaid, because the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that hinging all federal Medicaid funding on a 
state’s decision to expand Medicaid was overly coercive.31
Although most Republican-controlled states bolstered 
their rate review programs to become effective, in part, to 
prevent federal review of their carriers’ rate increases, only 
5% of all Republican-controlled states in the individual mar-
ket and only 10% of all Republican-controlled states in the 
small group market established state-based exchanges to 
avoid the federally facilitated exchange. Establishing a state-
based exchange, because of its visibility, could be construed 
as a tacit endorsement of the ACA. In fact, the American 
Legislative Exchange Council advocated for states to not 
establish state-based exchanges as a way to oppose the 
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ACA.32 Furthermore, the administrative burden to establish a 
state-based exchange is significant. DHHS grants totaled 
over $4 billion for states to establish state-based exchanges, 
16-fold more than the $250 million in grants for states to 
bolster their rate review programs.7,8,25 This administrative 
burden has a greater impact on Republican states, which are 
more likely to have lower capacity state governments.33
This study has 3 primary limitations. The small sample 
size of 50 states and the District of Columbia limits our 
power to detect statistical differences, potentially resulting in 
not rejecting the null hypothesis when there is a substantive 
difference. Notwithstanding the small sample size, we were 
able to detect important statistical differences.
Second, we do not incorporate how states reviewed health 
insurance rates sold through associations. Prior to the ACA, 
states often regulated associations’ rates in the large group 
market, or had less stringent requirements if they regulated 
them in the individual and small group markets.34,35 However, 
as of November 1, 2011, associations are subject to rate 
review regulations under the individual and small group 
markets.36 Therefore, a few states with effective rate review 
programs were considered to be ineffective in reviewing 
associations’ rates.4
Third, most states made decisions and changes related to 
rate review, loss ratios, Medicaid expansion, and state-based 
exchanges in 2011 and 2012. We classified states’ political 
party control as of January 31, 2011 to incorporate the 
November 2010 elections. Only Louisiana and Mississippi 
changed political party control in 2012, both from divided 
control to Republican control. In a few states, a policy change 
occurred in 2010, 2013, or 2014 under a different political 
party control than 2011; however, these rare events did not 
affect our main findings.
Conclusion
In principle, federalism combines state policy innovation and 
administration with federal financing and minimum stan-
dards, all of which are present in the ACA.37-39 The ACA 
sought to increase access to more affordable health insurance. 
It provided financial and regulatory incentives and goals for 
states to establish effective health insurance rate review pro-
grams, emulate the federal retrospective medical loss ratio 
requirement, expand Medicaid, and establish health insurance 
exchanges. Although the federalist goal for states to establish 
effective rate review programs was largely accomplished, 
including within Republican-controlled states, these states 
generally did not emulate the federal retrospective medical 
loss ratio requirement, expand Medicaid, or establish state-
based exchanges, because of their general opposition to the 
ACA. Our findings suggest that federal incentives for states 
to strengthen their health insurance rate review programs 
were more effective than the incentives for states to adopt 
other insurance-related policy goals of the ACA.
Appendix
Table A1 shows each state’s and the District of Columbia’s 
status and change in the following 4 policy areas of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA): rate review program effective-
ness status and change since the enactment of the ACA, 
Table A1. Rate Review Program Effectiveness, Anticipated Loss Ratio Requirement, State-Based Exchange, and Medicaid Expansion 
Statuses and Changes by State and Market.
Individual market Small group market  
State by political 
party control
Rate review 
program
Anticipated loss 
ratio requirement
State-based 
exchange
Rate review 
program
Anticipated loss 
ratio requirement
State-based 
exchange
Medicaid 
expansion
Republican
 Florida Always Eff <75% No Always Eff <75% No No
 Indiana Always Eff None No Always Eff None No No
 Kansas Always Eff <75% No Always Eff None No No
 Maine Always Eff <75% No Always Eff Always ≥75% No No
 Michigan Always Eff Nonea No Became Eff None No Yes
 Nebraska Always Eff None No Always Eff None No No
 North Dakota Always Eff <75% No Always Eff <75% No Yes
 Ohio Always Eff Always ≥75% No Always Eff None No Yes
 Pennsylvania Always Eff Nonea No Became Eff None No Yes
 South 
Carolina
Always Eff Became ≥75% No Became Eff Became ≥75% No No
 South Dakota Always Eff Became ≥75% No Became Eff Always ≥75% No No
 Tennessee Always Eff <75% No Became Eff <75% No No
anticipated loss ratio requirement status and change since the 
enactment of the ACA, state-based exchange status, and 
Medicaid expansion status, all which were used to generate 
Figures 3 and 4 in the main article. The table is sorted by 
state political party control.
(continued)
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Individual market Small group market  
State by political 
party control
Rate review 
program
Anticipated loss 
ratio requirement
State-based 
exchange
Rate review 
program
Anticipated loss 
ratio requirement
State-based 
exchange
Medicaid 
expansion
 Utah Always Eff None No Always Eff None Yes No
 Arizona Became Eff <75% No Became Eff None No Yes
 Georgia Became Eff None No Became Eff None No No
 Idaho Became Eff None Yes Became Eff None Yes No
 Wisconsin Became Eff None No Became Eff None No No
 Alabama Ineff None No Ineff None No No
 Oklahoma Ineff None No Ineff <75% No No
 Texas Ineff None No Ineff None No No
 Wyoming Ineff None No Ineff None No No
Politically divided
 Colorado Always Eff Became ≥75% Yes Always Eff Became ≥75% Yes Yes
 Iowa Always Eff <75% No Became Eff Became ≥75% No Yes
 Kentucky Always Eff None Yes Always Eff None Yes Yes
 Minnesota Always Eff <75% Yes Always Eff Always ≥75% Yes Yes
 Mississippi Always Eff None No Always Eff None Yes No
 Nevada Always Eff Nonea Yes Became Eff Nonea Yes Yes
 New 
Hampshire
Always Eff <75% No Always Eff Became ≥75% No Yes
 New Jersey Always Eff Always ≥75% No Always Eff Always ≥75% No Yes
 New Mexico Always Eff Became ≥75% Yes Always Eff Became ≥75% Yes Yes
 New York Always Eff Always ≥75% Yes Always Eff Became ≥75% Yes Yes
 North 
Carolina
Always Eff Nonea No Always Eff Nonea No No
 Oregon Always Eff None Yes Always Eff None Yes Yes
 Rhode Island Always Eff None Yes Always Eff None Yes Yes
 Alaska Became Eff None No Became Eff None No No
 Louisiana Became Eff None No Became Eff None No No
 Montana Became Eff None No Became Eff None No No
 Virginia Became Eff Became ≥75% No Became Eff Became ≥75% No No
 Missouri Ineff None No Ineff None No No
Democrat
 Arkansas Always Eff Became ≥75% No Always Eff Became ≥75% No Yes
 California Always Eff Became ≥75% Yes Always Eff Became ≥75% Yes Yes
 Connecticut Always Eff None Yes Became Eff None Yes Yes
 Delaware Always Eff <75% No Always Eff <75% No Yes
 District of 
Columbia
Always Eff <75% Yes Became Eff <75% Yes Yes
 Hawaii Always Eff None Yes Always Eff None Yes Yes
 Illinois Always Eff None No Became Eff None No Yes
 Maryland Always Eff Became ≥75% Yes Always Eff Always ≥75% Yes Yes
 Vermont Always Eff <75% Yes Always Eff None Yes Yes
 Washington Always Eff <75% Yes Always Eff None Yes Yes
 West Virginia Always Eff <75% No Always Eff <75% No Yes
 Massachusetts Became Eff Became ≥75% Yes Became Eff Became ≥75% Yes Yes
Note. Rate review program effectiveness was coded based on March 23, 2010, status (when the Affordable Care Act was enacted) and April 16, 2014, status. 
Always Eff: always had an effective rate review program since the enactment of the Affordable Care Act; Became Eff: became an effective rate review program after 
a change via legislation or regulation; Ineff: ineffective rate review program as of April 16, 2014. Anticipated loss ratio requirement was coded based on March 23, 
2010, and December 31, 2013, statuses. Always ≥75%, always had an anticipated loss ratio requirement at or above 75% since the enactment of the Affordable Care 
Act; Became ≥75%, anticipated loss ratio requirement became at or above 75%; <75%, anticipated loss ratio requirement was less than 75%; None, no anticipated 
loss ratio requirement. Medicaid expansion was coded based on August 28, 2014, status. State-based exchange was coded based on October 31, 2013, status.
aThese states have “none” coded in the table because the major carrier type(s) based on market share in the state did not have an anticipated loss 
ratio requirement; however, the following minor carrier type(s) did have an anticipated loss ratio requirement: Michigan for-profit insurers (individual 
market), Nevada non-profit carriers (individual and small group markets), North Carolina for-profit insurers (individual market) and health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs; individual and small group markets), and Pennsylvania for-profit insurers (individual market).
Table A1. (continued)
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